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STANLEY V. GEORGIA: A FIRST AMENDMENT APPROACH TO
OBSCENITY CONTROL
In 1957 in Roth v. United States' the Supreme Court declared that ob-
scenity as a class of expression was without first amendment protection.
While officially upholding the validity of Roth, the Court has quietly
narrowed the application of this declaration through a series of modify-
ing decisions.2  The most recent of these modifying decisions is Stanley
v. Georgia.'
Robert Eli Stanley was being investigated by federal and state agents
for suspected bookmaking activities. On the basis of this investigation
they secured a search warrant and entered his home. No evidence of
bookmaking activities was found, but the officers did find three reels of
movie film in an upstairs bedroom. The officers borrowed a projector
from the same home and viewed the films. Concluding that the films were
obscene and determing that Stanley occupied the bedroom in which they
were seized, the state officers arrested Stanley. He was convicted for know-
ingly possessing obscene material in violation of Georgia law.' That con-
viction was affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court.5 Upon appeal, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that
the first and fourteenth amendments prohibited making mere private pos-
session of obscene material a crime.
6
The issue of private possession of obscene material was not a new one.
It had been given thorough consideration by the Ohio Supreme Court in
1960 in the case of State v. Mapp.7 The majority of court felt that the
1 359 U.S. 476 (1957).
2 Se Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966).
8 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
4 GEORGIA CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1969) provides:
Any person... who shall knowingly have possession of ... any obscene matter ...
shall ... be guilty of a felony ....
Prior to Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), in addition to Georgia, the following states
had provided that mere possession of obscene material was illegal:
(1) Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2707 & 41-2729 (Supp. 1967));
(2) Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-17(4) (1963));
(3) Florida (FLA. ST. ANN. § 847.011(2) (1960));
(4) Indiana (IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-2803 (Supp. 1969));
(5) Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2901 (1964));
(6) New Mexico (N. M. STAT. ANN. § 14-17-14(1) (1953) (providing that munici-
palities may prohibit possession);
(7) Texas (TEX. PEN. ART. 527 (Supp. 1968-69) (that portion relating to possession
was declared unconstitutional in Stein v. Bachelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex.
1969) );
(8) Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 944.21(b) & 944.22 (1957));
(9) Wyoming (WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-103 (Supp. 1969)).
5 Stanley v. State, 229 Ga. 259, 161 S.E. 2d 309 (1968).
6 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
7 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960).
Ohio statute which made possession of obscene material illegal was "a
clear infringement of the constitutional rights of the individual" and was
inconsistent with the "basic liberties of the individual."" This case (Mapp
v. Ohio)' was appealed to the United States Supreme Court where the is-
sue of private possession was extensively briefed and argued. 10 However,
the Court chose to disregard that issue in favor of the illegal search and
seizure issue present in the case. Since the issue of illegal search and sei-
zure was present in Stanley and had been briefed before the Court," one
wonders why the Court did not follow the Mapp precedent in Stanley.
Certainly the Court was aware of the far-reaching implications of its ex-
tension of protection, albeit in the private context, to obscene material.
Since these implications could have been avoided while still accomplishing
a reversal of Stanley's conviction, one must conclude that the Court in-
tended these implications to emanate from Stanley.
Because the alleged obscenity of the films was not contested, the Court
assumed that they were obscene. 2 Relying on the declaration in Roth,
Georgia contended that since the films were obscene, they were unpro-
tected and could be dealt with in any way the states deemed necessary."
However, the Court declined to follow Roth because Roth involved public
distribution while Stanley involved only private possession.'"
Distinguishing Roth on this contextual ground was unsatisfactory be-
cause it did not indicate why the rationale for denial of first amend-
ment protection used in Roth did not apply in Stanley. In Roth the mate-
rial was precluded from first amendment protection because the films
were utterly without redeeming social value. 5 The films in Stanley were
8 1d. at 437. Four of the seven Ohio Justices in Ohio v. Mapp felt that the Ohio Statute
(OIuo REv. CODE ANN. § 2905.34 (Page 1954) ) was unconstitutional. However, because at
that time the Ohio Constitution required that all but one of the justices concur before there
could be £ declaration of unconstitutionality, it was not so declared. Shortly thereafter, the Ohio
Supreme Court interpreted the Ohio Statute to require proof of "possession and control for the
purpose of circulation or exhibition." State v. Jacobellis, 173 Ohio St. 22, 27-28, 179 N.E.2d
772, 781 (1962) reVsd on other grounds, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
O Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), was the federal counterpart of State v. Mapp, 170
Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960).
10 367 U.S. 643, 673 (1961) (dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan).
" Brief for Appellant at 16-23, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
12394 U.S. 557 n.2 (1969).
1Ad. at 560.
141d. at 560-63. The Court stated that:
None of the statements cited by the Court in Roth for the proposition that "this Court
has always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press"
were made in the context of a statute punishing mere private possession....
In this context, we do not believe that this case can be decided simply by citing
Roth.
15 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957). In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), the Court re-
iterated the Roth rationale as follows:
"We would reiterate ... our recognition in Roth that obscenity is excluded from con-
stitutional protection only because it is 'utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance ......
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obscene and thus by definition without redeeming social value.' Why
did this utter lack of redeeming social value not justify denial of first
amendment protection in Stanley? Certainly the films did not gain re-
deeming social value by their presence in the private home of Stanley. In
fact this private context would have lessened any social value that the
films might have had because the public would have had no access. A
better basis for a distinction would have been to indicate the different is-
sues in the two cases. In Roth the Court was interested in an analysis of
the nature of obscene utterances. In Stanley the main consideration was an
evaluation of the states' interests justifying obscenity control.
Since the Court was able to dismiss the Roth argument, the stage was
set for an evaluation of the competing interests of the parties. Stanley's
most important right was his first amendment right to "receive informa-
tion and ideas."'" The Court found this right to be so "fundamental"
and "well established" that a mere categorization of the films as obscene
was insufficient justification for invasion of that right.' Further, that
right was protected "regardless of the social worth of the material being
received."' 9  In addition to the reception right was Stanley's right to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into the privacy of his
home.2° When the privacy right was joined with the right to receive in-
formation and ideas regardless of their social value, the latter took on an
added dimension.21 In essence, Stanley was performing a constitutionally
protected act (possession) in a constitutionally protected place (his home).
Against these rights Georgia asserted several traditional state justifica-
tions for prohibition of possession of obscene material. The Court made
short work of rejecting these. Georgia first contended that it had a right
to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity. The Court
characterized this contention as "hardly more than an assertion that the
state had the right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts. 2
Characterized as such, this right was "wholly inconsistent with the philoso-
phy of the First Amendment." 23  Next Georgia contended that exposure
to obscene material might lead to deviant sexual behavior or sexual crimes
of violence. 4 This argument fared no better than the previous one. The
Court noted the lack of empirical evidence linking the reading or viewing
16 Part of the definition of obscenity as established by Roth and elaborated in subsequent
cases is that the material be utterly without redeeming social value. Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413, 418 (1965).
17 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
18 Id. at 565.
19 Id. at 564.
20 ld.
21 Id.
22Id. at 565.
23 1d at 566.
24 Id.
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of obscene material with deviant behavior.2 However, this lack of em-
pirical evidence was not the main reason for the rejection of this conten-
tion. The Court indicated that at least in the context of private con-
sumption of information and ideas, education and punishment of deviant
behavior rather than prohibition of obscene material, were the proper
deterrents. 6 Georgia's last contention was that prohibition of possession of
obscene material was necessary to the states' statutory schemes of prohibit-
ing public distribution. Georgia argued that intent to distribute would be
too difficult to prove.2 7  The Court was not convinced that such diffi-
culties existed; and even if they did, they did not justify infringement of
the first amendment.2 8
Except for this last contention, the Georgia contentions are the ones
most frequently cited by commentators in justification of obscenity legis-
lation in general.29 There is little indication in the majority opinion that
the reasoning used to reject these contentions in the private context would
not apply to the public context as well. In fact, in regard to Georgia's first
contention (the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of
obscenity) the Court specifically states:
Whatever the power of the state to control the public dissemination of
ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise leg-
islation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts.3 0
(emphasis added)
Further, in regard to Georgia's second contention (exposure to obscenity
may lead to deviant sexual behavior) the same criticisms found in the
private context of Stanley should also apply to the public context. Cer-
tainly there is no more empirical evidence linking public distribution of
obscenity with deviant sexual behavior than there is linking private pos-
session of obscenity with such behavior. Also, would not education and
punishment be just as proper a deterrent to deviant sexual behavior as it
was declared to be in the private context of Stanley? In view of the above,
Stanley may be read to raise the question of whether obscenity law in
general can be justified by these state interests. This is one of the most
significant implications of Stanley.
Another interesting implication of Stanley is its moderating effect upon
Roth. No longer is the declaration that "obscenity is not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech or press"'" completely true. It is pro-
2 51d.
261d. at 566-67.
27d. at 567.
2 d. at 567-68.
29 Henkin, Mords and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLu mf. L REv. 391,
392-95 (1963). Other commentators have broken down these two interests into several cate-
gories. See, e.g., Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 3-4.
30394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969).
31354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
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tected speech at least within the privacy context of Stanley. However, the
Court explicitly stated that this modifying effect did not impair Roth or
the broad state power to regulate obscenity in the public context. 2 Thus
Roth and Stanley must coexist within the same system of obscenity law.
For them to function effectively it will become necessary for the Court to
determine exactly what public distribution and private possession entail.
The importance of the privacy aspect of private possession of obscene
material will be a key factor in determining how broadly Stanley applies.
The Court has previously indicated that the privacy of one's home has
great significance.38 Perhaps, in view of these indications, the Court con-
sidered the privacy of Stanley's home to be so sacred that it was willing to
extend constitutional protection to material that otherwise would have
been unprotected. If this is the case, then a Roth-type prohibition would
apply to obscene material prior to its arrival in a private home and after
its removal from a private home. This is the narrowest reading of Stanley
and would cause the least conflict with Roth.,4
A broader reading of Stanley is justified. The language used in the
majority opinion indicates that the right to receive information and ideas
regardless of their social value (the reception right) and not the privacy
right was the principal foundation of the decision. The Court indicated
that the reception right was a fundamental and well established part of
the first amendment. 35 The privacy right was simply an additional right
that gave added dimension to the reception right. The existance of this
fundamental reception right as established in Stanley has implications for
other obscenity contexts. Arguably, this right would protect production
and some types of public distribution of obscene material. In the ob-
scenity context, for a person to fully enjoy his reception right, some form of
acquisition of obscene material is necessary. Such acquisition would de-
pend upon production of obscene material. As a practical matter, it also
would depend upon public distribution of that material. If all production
and distribution of obscene material were banned, in the obscenity con-
text, the reception right would also be effectively banned. Since Stanley
32 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
3 3 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (holding that a homeowner has standing
to object to an unlawful surveillance of conversations taking place in his home although he was
not a conversant); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 476 (1965) (where the right of privacy
was first identified as an independent constitutional right).
34 While this would be the narrowest reading as far as obscenity is concerned, it would be
a very broad interpretation of the right of privacy. Given this reading Stanley would have a
great potential for application in such controversial areas as private consensual adult deviant
sexual behavior and private possession of marijuana. See Wallenstein, Marijuana Possession as
an Aspect of the Right of Privacy, 5 CRiM. L. BULL. 59 (March, 1969); Evans, The Crimes
Against Nature, 16 J. PUB. L 159, 177-78 (1967). These two articles provide excellent dis-
cussions of the relationship between the right of privacy and these two types of criminal actions.
36 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
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prohibits banning of the latter, does it not prohibit total banning of the
former also?
However, in light of the Court's reaffirmation of the broad state
power to regulate obscenity in the public context, it would be foolish to
suggest that all public distribution is protected by Stanley. If such were
the case, Roth would be meaningless. Therefore, the key question is
where the line between Stanley protection and Roth prohibition will be
drawn. The Supreme Court did not draw this line, but fortunately other
federal courts in their interpretations of Stanley have provided us with
some clues to its location. The District Court for the Northern District
of Texas in Stein v. Batchelo?6 interpreted Stanley to involve broader
protection than mere private possession. The Stein court said that in its
opinion Stanley suggested that obscene material could be deprived of pro-
tection only in the context of "public actions taken or intended to be
taken with respect to obscene matter."3 7  This interpretation allowed the
District Court to invalidate not only the provision of Texas obscenity law
prohibiting the knowing possession of obscene material but also those pro-
visions prohibiting the knowing photography of, acting in, posing for and
printing of obscene material. This follows from the fact that there
was no limitation in the Texas law that such activities be engaged in pub-
licly or with intent to publicly distribute the materials involved .3  The
D.C. Circuit Court in Williams v. District of Columbia,"0 in order to pre-
serve the constitutionality of a disorderly conduct statute punishing the use
of obscene language in any public place, read into that statute the require-
ment that a member of the public actually have heard the obscene words.4°
The D.C. Court spoke of Stanley requiring the presence of this "verbal as-
sault." In view of this language the D.C. Court must have read Stanley to
require more than just the presence of obscene material in a public context
to justify prohibition of that material. Some type of offensive public ac-
tion had to be taken in regard to that obscene material. This is an even
broader interpretation of Stanley than that given in Stein. Williams re-
quired an actual act whereas intent to act would have been sufficient in
Stein.41
As more federal courts and state courts interpret Stanley, the line be-
36 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969) (rev. granted, 38 L.W. 3265).
37 Id. at 606.
3 8 TEx. PnEN. CODE ART. 527 (Supp. 1968-69).
30 No. 20, 927 (D.C. Cir., June 20, 1969) (en bane).
4oId. at 11.
41 Only a year before Stanley, the Supreme Court indicated the types of action which were
necessary in order to justify the prohibition of obscene material. The Court indicated that the
fact of (1) an availability of obscene material to children; or (2) intrusion into the privacy of
the public by that obscene material; or (3) the type of pandering found objectionable in Ginz-
burg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), was necessary before the material in question could
be prohibited. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967).
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tween Roth prohibition and Stanley protection will become more dear.
However, these two areas of protection will never become exactly defined
because the subject of obscenity depends so much upon the particular
facts of the situation. For instance, a supposedly private possession case
might call for different treatment if the obscene material were readily ac-
cessible to children or if the possessor had a past record of selling ob-
scene material. Also the number of items of obscene material possessed
might change the nature of the case. If the possessor had numerous
copies of the same film or magazine, a presumption of possession with
intent to distribute might arise.4" These few examples indicate that no hard
or fast rules can be drawn in regard to the regulation of obscenity. The
only certain thing concerning the future controversy over obscenity con-
trol is that there will continue to be a struggle between the libertarian
impulses to protect freedom of speech and press and the realistic needs
for some obscenity regulation. At least after Stanley, there is hope that
these two conflicting forces can be more consistently reconciled.
Gene R. Hoellrich
4 2 Currently three states, although not statutorily prohibiting possession of obscene material,
provide that possession of a specified amount of obscene material either creates a presumption
that such material was intended for sale or is prima facia evidence of intent to distribute. S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-18-26 (1967); Mici. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 750.343(a) (1969);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:15 (1955).
[Vol. 31
